The sardonic remark about 'integrated coffee' belongs, of course, to Malcolm X. The European Union today has the integration of migrants as a major issue in its policy agenda, at the time of the greatest crisis hitting capitalism since the 1930s: it is somehow ironic that the controversy over migrants' integration is one the most controversial issues during a crisis threatening the disintegration of the Eurozone.
This chapter aims to show some contradictions within EU policy on the integration of migrants. Various instruments of EU integration policy contain contradictions at conceptual and implementation levels; as such, they also contain elements which can and have been interpreted positively, opening up spaces for progressive and emancipatory politics. However, the underlying social, political, economic and ideological factors defining the crux of integration at EU and Member State level are premised on the logic that migrants are essentially responsible for the 'social problems' relating to how they are accommodated. The post-Maastricht regime of unifying and integrating the EU by enhancing free movement of the factors of production, including labour, has also generated external/internal frontiers and exclusion/inferiorization mechanisms. New forms of racialization have been generated whereby certain migrants are treated as 'deviants'. Hence a new politics has emerged concerning who can and who ought to be integrated.
This chapter also attempts to (re)conceptualize the framework of the EU and national policies on migrant integration, as it evolved with an
The notion of integration in EU treaties and policy documents
Integration of migrants became an EU policy area with the adoption of the Council Conclusion on Immigrant Integration Policy in European Union, 1 which agreed on the Common Basic Principles:
a. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. b. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU. c. Employment is a key part of the integration process. d. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions is indispensable for integration. e. Efforts in education are critical for preparing immigrants to be more successful and active. f. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a nondiscriminatory way is an essential foundation. g. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism.
If we are to salvage anything from the integration debates, rather than rejecting the concept, a positive interpretation of integration must be offered, drawing on the logic that democratic and inclusive policy-making requires that EU governance must be based on the most effective participation, particularly of those from below, that is, the subaltern migrants. Addressing global and regional issues, such as migration-related phenomena, requires transnational initiatives, which simultaneously value, appreciate and respect national, regional and local specificities and contexts and reflect this in practice. If we wish to rescue the term, the whole package must be stripped of any reactionary, race-related or assimilationist undertones. In this spirit, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) opinion (2011) has underscored effective migrant participation:
Democratic governance is based on the principle that all members of the political community should be able to take part directly and indirectly in the governmental decision-making process. If integration policies are to be successful, civil society and local and regional authorities must be actively involved in their drawing up, implementation and evaluation.
In a democratic society, everybody affected by collective decisions must be able to influence and participate in those decisions. Democracy in the European multicultural cities of the 21st Century must be improved through the participation of residents whose rights of political participation are restricted: residents from third countries. (Gropas Zapata-Barrero, 2011) Integration covers a very wide span of policy areas which create a general framework where migrants and non-migrants alike co-exist, cooperate and exchange ideas, experiences and socio-cultural expressions as they MAC/CIEM Page-67 9781137293992_05_cha04
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Nicos Trimikliniotis 67 together co-shape society. A key task for developing integration as a policy tool is to draw on its progressive cornerstones: what, then, are the best 'processes that would constantly renew and rejuvenate participation, access and belonging' (see Anthias, 2012) ? It has to be simultaneously recognized that, inevitably, there are contestations, contradictions and challenges; for society entails conflicts and opposing priorities, interests and ideas, particularly in an era characterized by intense social, economic, cultural and social transformations and upheavals. Moreover, in the current climate of economic crisis and social turmoil, uncertainty, fear and rising xenophobia, the question of immigrant integration acquires a greater sense of urgency. In this context, it is essential to properly engage in a dialogue about how best to develop a policy framework for migrant integration that would most effectively and creatively incorporate those for whom the policy is particularly designed and those affected at large: all communities at local, regional and national level are in this sense 'stakeholders'. The policy areas covered are access to employment, health, housing, education, democratic decision-making and citizenship, and all aspects of social life and cultural expressions. The EESC (2011) considers that integration and social inclusion policies adopted by local and regional authorities should focus on a number of different areas, 2 such as the following: initial reception; teaching the language, laws and customs; housing; health; combating poverty; combating discrimination; employment and training policies; gender equality; education for children; family policy; youth policy; healthcare; providing social services and facilitating public participation. The staff of public authorities must reflect ethnic and cultural diversity and public employees must be given intercultural training. Intercultural and interreligious dialogue and cooperation should be promoted at local and regional level.
We are thus required to positively and urgently respond to the challenge eloquently encapsulated some time ago by Lefebvre (1996) as 'the right to the city', a challenge which transcends the city and nationstate borders and which has long become both 'a cry and a demand' at a local, national, regional and global level. Media and other reports often depict European societies as somehow 'shocked' or 'surprised' by the presence of migrants, and migration-related phenomena, such as 'integration', are depicted as novel and unprecedented manifestations of globalization. While it is undeniable that the current globalized (Groenendijk, 2012, pp. 3-14) . Matters have come a long way since then, as integration is now solely directed towards third country nationals (TCNs): European Union citizens on the move are merely exercising their long-established right to free movement; they are not subject to immigration control, and it is assumed that no integration measures are required for these groups of workers. Yet, racism, discrimination, xenophobia, exclusion and exploitation are faced by many subaltern migrant workers who are EU citizens but are at the lower echelons of the labour hierarchy. It was the Tampere meeting in October 1999 that gave a new impetus to the subject when it emphasized the importance of 'ensuring fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States'. Crucial was the adoption of the Council Conclusion on Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union, 3 which agreed on the Common Basic Principles. The current situation after the Lisbon Treaty requires that the EU institutions cooperate with national authorities for shaping and implementing integration policy. This 'common immigration policy' is justified on three grounds (art. 79.4) and is aimed at ensuring: a. the efficient management of migration flows; b. fair treatment of TCNs residing legally in Member States; and c. the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.
EU integration policy is based on the logic that, while there will be a 'common immigration policy', any integration measures shall be of a 'supportive' nature to Member States, which retain immigration and borders control as a manifestation of national sovereignty. 4 It is a matter of shared competence between the European Parliament and the Council (art. 79.4) . Similarly, the logic of shared competence applies in order to adopt measures to regulate the conditions of entry, residence and standards of stay. 5 In this sense, a very wide range of policy initiatives provide the basis for integration policies across the EU Member States despite the very distinct situations and policy priorities and contexts.
To appreciate the plurality and richness of experience requires going beyond the legal understanding; the EESC (Castaños, 2012) Integration is not a legal act, but rather a complex, long-term social process, with many dimensions and many stakeholders involved, particularly at local level. The social integration process takes place within society's structures and in various areas of people's lives: family, neighborhood and city, workplace, school, training centre, university, association, place of worship, sports club, etc.
The understanding of integration as 'a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states' requires the assumption that there is some kind of homogeneity of 'the migrants' versus 'the host population'. Yet, speaking of 'proper' incorporation of migrants into a 'host society', we enter highly problematic and outdated sociological logic and vocabulary (Kostakopoulou, 2010a (Kostakopoulou, , 2010b Trimikliniotis, 2012) . Despite this, if we are to make a positive construction of integration as participation, access and belonging, then integration policies must not be used as an excuse to bring in restrictive migration policies or, indeed, any other exclusionary and xenophobic elements. The EESC recognizes that there are gaps in the implementation of Common Basic Principles:
The social process of integration must be based on a legislative framework which guarantees 'bringing immigrants' rights and duties, as well as access to goods, services and means of civic participation progressively into line with those of the rest of the population, under conditions of equal opportunities and treatment'. 6 The first of the Common Basic Principles of the European Union's integration policy 7 states that 'Integration is a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.' 8 On the positive side, one can see the potential for the development of a more effective system of monitoring and implementing integration policies via a system of standard-setting, benchmarking, measuring the process and evolution on the basis of social indicators. However, as is apparent from the declaration of the European Ministerial Conference on Integration at Zaragoza, 9 there was no agreement on developing a genuine system of binding indicators to properly compare and evaluate integration policies: the matter was relegated to an annex and referred to a potential to be explored in the future. Only a pilot study was agreed upon. 10 The Annex of the Declaration states that 'a limited number of policy areas of relevance for integration have been identified as priority areas to policy areas and indicators at present', which would play a role in 'building on national experiences and key areas for the common basic principles'. Hence, employment was placed at the core of the integration process (not merely access to the labour market); while education was seen as 'essential in helping immigrants to become successful and more active participants in society'. Numerous studies have attempted to measure such indicators, with varying degrees of success in shedding more light on the state we are in at EU and national level. Comparative studies of indicators from the different policy areas between different countries compare and contrast how each country is doing in the various policies, as well getting a global picture of the EU as a whole (and beyond). However, the main criticism is the attempt to reduce the complexity of contextual reality into percentage numbers and abstract graphs, often missing some dynamic issues which are irreducible to numbers. Other studies take a more qualitative and contextual approach to comparison (Bertossi, 2010; Strik et al., 2010; Vertovec and Wessendrof, 2010; Anthias et al., 2012; ) . So far, there is no consensus among the EU Member States on making such a regime more robust and shaping common indicators, because, some argue, they do not share the same policy priorities in terms of policy goals, reflecting the different political and ideological backgrounds and motives of the various actors in EU and national policy-making.
Locating integration policy in a broader context: A critical approach
The debates over integration of TCNs open up the issue of the meaning and scope of integration policy across the multitude of experiences in the EU. However, particularly in the current polarized environment and economic austerity, the debate cannot escape from its context: the question of integration becomes a highly divisive issue, as there are opposing views, interests and agendas. When it comes to addressing the question of which policies respond to the various 'needs' in society, the question becomes whose society and what sort of society different political, economic, ideological and social forces groups want. In any case, there are different levels of governance in the EU, each one of which reflects the specific constellation and balance of forces formed in particular historical contexts.
The integration agendas, therefore, very much reflect distinct and often opposing political agendas; as such, if we were to map the integration agendas across the EU countries and at the level of EU institutions, MAC/CIEM Page-71 9781137293992_05_cha04
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Nicos Trimikliniotis 71 we ought to map contestations about the meaning and priorities of integration. Moreover, in order to understand these debates they need to be located in various dimensions of neo-liberal transformations in the EU. In fact, we could nicely locate integration policies as tools or instruments, or at least specific technologies in the Foucaultian sense of a broader framework in what Ong (2006a) calls 'neoliberalism as a mobile technology': integration is best located within the EU as part of 'neoliberal regionalism' and the 'management of mobility' (Pellerin and Overbeek, 2001) , based on the principle that 'strategies of governing are re-engineering political spaces and populations' (Ong, 2006a) . Integration is squarely premised on the policy of 'combating illegal migrants', whereby not only certain forms of mobility, and certain forms of life, are socially constructed as 'irregular', but, more importantly, in this way the 'EU naturalizes a particular "imagined world" ' (Walters, 2010, p. 75) . Admittedly, if we are to give justice to such a critique, the EU package of integration of migrants needs to be rejected altogether; something conceptually simple. Yet, the notion will continue to be used as a policy frame. Integration needs to be understood in its particular context, taking seriously into account issues relating to class, gender, racialization and migration within EU Member States (see Slany et al., 2010; Anthias et al., 2012) . Also, one has to consider specific aspects pertaining to labour migration, exclusion and subordination (Neergaard, 2009 ) and the (re)production of precariousness as a specific feature of migrant labour (Schierup, 2007; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; . Integration must be properly located in and perceived as being closely interconnected to its broader socio-economic and ideological context (Berggren, 2008; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Tsianos 2013) . In this sense the history and pre-history of integration debates need to be revisited (see Kostakopoulou, 2010a; Anthias, 2012; Pascouau, 2012; Trimikliniotis, 2012) .
But what is integration?
This confirms Stuart Hall's insistence that the 'the multicultural question', that is, different groups living together, is 'the underlying question of globalization' (quoted by Yuval-Davis et al., 2006, p. 6) : the question of 'integration' is precisely a question about living together despite differences. However, to make the question meaningful in scrutinizing policy or researching the field more widely, it must be turned on its head. This is the only way to make any study possible, as it is next to (Anthias, 2006) . Integration is already a 'legal' concept producing legal results (Groenendijk, 2004) as much as a sociological and political concept. Some scholars insist that the British version of integration, disguised as 'social cohesion', is essentially a revamped and repackaged version of assimilation, what has been branded as 'new assimilationism' (Rattansi, 2004) ; a critique developed to cover the ways in which there has been a terminological shift away from multiculturalism towards 'civic integration' and 'social cohesion' (Kostakopoulou, 2010a; Ratcliffe and Newman, 2011; Anthias, 2012) . Precisely because we are dealing with a fluid and contested package of policies, and despite the criticisms levelled against integration, contained within the integration package are some 'positive' or 'constructive' elements (Groenendijk, 2004) , which help to serve the social needs of migrants as well as enhancing institutional processes so that society as a whole 'opens up' and allows social incorporation. In this understanding, the burden of integration is not a migrant affair but a societal affair.
Various studies on integration of migrants in Europe locate a number of problems with the way it is understood and conceptualized by policymakers in the EU institutions and at national/local level, and reach broadly similar conclusions. Research findings illustrate the flaws, weaknesses and untenable assumptions about the reality of migrant integration. The aspirations, sense of belonging and ways of life of migrants are highly differentiated, as are those of so-called natives. For instance, the level of 'satisfaction' and notions of 'belonging' varies across different generations: in general, a number of first-generation migrants have more positive attitudes, while native and second-generation migrants alike share a more critical outlook on political institutions (Maxwell, 2010) . The incorporation of migrants in societies cannot be measured merely as a state-related process but, rather, against the totality of different domains such as state, market, welfare and culture, given that it is 'essentially the product of the intersection of migrant aspirations and strategies with regulatory frameworks' (Freeman, 2004) .
The rise of new breeds of racism, xenophobia and anti-migrant politics is a serious matter undermining any notion of integration. There are different explanations put forward for the sources of the current rise of negative attitudes towards immigrants in Europe (see PROSINT, 2010; Rustenbach, 2010; Strik et al., 2010) . Many migrant workers in precarious positions experience the 'new' integration drive as exclusionary, in terms of culture, ethnicity, class, gender and religion (see Pajnik et al., 2010; Anthias et al., 2012) . Extensive and diverse research on the subject (see Pascouau and Strik, 2012) points to the vulnerability and precarious position of third country migrants in different economic sectors.
For the vast majority of precarious migrants (not the elites of settled migrants), the broad integration regime is hardly perceived as a two-way process, as declared; rather, they perceive the way it is implemented as conditions and measures to exclude, marginalize and subordinate migrants (see Pajnik et al., 2010; . Despite institutional development of policy instruments for integration, the implementation of basic elements for access and participation of migrants seems inadequate for low-skilled and precarious third country workers. In practice, rather than finding processes of reskilling of migrants via the EU proclamations about access and participation in the labour market, studies show deskilling for the precarious migrants, that is, the vast majority of migrants. Moreover, the failure to properly target and deal with highly gendered processes is crucial (for example, in terms of gender division of labour in highly feminized sectors such as the care sector, cleaning and the sex industry). The distinct absence of the gender dimension in EU mechanisms of integration also reflects the marginal position of third country migrant women in the gender equality and feminist movement.
Despite the goals of labour integration, there is strong evidence of structural forces which perpetuate the precariousness of migrants (and not only migrants), such as labour segmentation, patterns of discrimination, geographical concentration, housing segregation, higher risk of unemployment and deskilling, and lack of opportunities to break the cycle of deprivation. Instead of benefiting from measures to enhance their participation, access and belonging, many migrants have experienced increasing marginalization and repression via the mechanisms to restrict migration. Finally, integration measures overall fail to touch upon the most precarious of migrants, the undocumented and informal migrants, rendering this group of migrants precarious in perpetuity. The focus on 'legal migrants' may be founded on politically pragmatic reasons, as this is the specific mandate of the EU Treaties; however, it leaves the lives of the most vulnerable to irregular markets and super-exploitation. 
(Re)conceptualizing integration
Integration/migration is becoming a prime example of the opposite of consensus, of dissensus (Rancière, 2010a) . The transformations caused by such mobilities of people force us to see migration as a dynamic for change, as both its symptom and its driver. We can even go further and conceive migration as a mass social movement (Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Mezzadra, 2009; Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013) : in this sense migration is a constituent force in the reformulation of sovereignty (Papadopoulos et al., 2008, p. 202) . The question of integration has two faces: on the one hand, it is about how to facilitate migrants who are included and welcomed; on the other, it is about rejecting and excluding the migrants who are seen as unfit for integration. The second face of integration is essentially about migration, and it is premised on 'combating illegal migration', as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. Migration is, paradoxically, a manifestation of defining the global era of 'free movement' while the massive security industry of 'controlling' and 'managing' seeks to erect new obstacles to this free movement. Migration is a defining characteristic of an accelerating mobile world, as labour is a factor of production and commodity, which must be mobile to respond to the logic of the reproduction of capital in the endless pursuit of profit and new markets. Governments, international trade and labour organizations are engaged in an increasingly interdependent world to ensure that migration is smooth in what we can consider to be the normality of the current world characterized by inequality; it is, therefore, a function of ordering. Migration must be perceived as a function of inequality, war and disasters.
Yet, in this era of 'free movement', which generates the necessity for migration in terms of demand for migrant labour (the so-called pull factors) and socio-economic and political conditions expelling populations (the so-called push-factors), the most powerful restrictions on migration have been imposed. There is criminalization; crossing without documents for the vast majority of the world's population in the 227 borders of the globe; 'illegal immigration', in the form of defiance of borders as criminal acts of uninvited arrivals or overstaying are branded as acts of deviance en masse. Irregular migration as a social phenomenon is increasingly constructed as connected to security, crime and terrorism; certain categories of migrants become the deviants par excellence. Even though migration is a heterogeneous process and highly differentiated in terms of class, gender and 'race', the migration debates reflect ideological struggles often reflecting and/or augmenting geopolitics, including the MAC/CIEM Page-75 9781137293992_05_cha04
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'enculturation' of ideological conflicts, globalization and national or European identity questions, where culture/religion is a central part of debates about integration and the economy.
Construction of certain migrant categories as deviants
The flip side of integration of those who are desired is the warand-crime-inspired policy of 'combating' the undesired, the unwanted migrants, a matter which has become crucial in creating the politics of fear in the way Cohen (1972 Cohen ( /2002 has elegantly described in his work on 'moral panics'. Fekete's analysis of the construction of the 'suitable enemy' in the EU is an instance of the processes of constituting the deviant migrant across EU Member States. The celebrated neo-liberal 'great leap forward' in the direction of capitalist integration in the form of the political/economic unification after the Maastricht Treaty also configured the structure for the new forms of racialization whereby certain migrants are treated as 'deviants'. The process of the harmonization asylum and immigration laws and norms led to 'a new pan-European racism directed against asylumseekers and migrant workers' (Fekete, 2009, p. 1) . The technological innovation of surveillance, social and crime control in 'the age of migration' (Castles and Miller, 2009 ) characterized what the US has branded a global 'war on terror' and has brought about a paradigm shift in the criminal law and the rule of law. The nucleus of the rule of law built on the myth of the presumption of innocence has been eroded. Der Spiegel's pictorial depiction of Germany as 'a massively overcrowded boat' whereby criminals/migrants are responsible for the 'sinking' is but a manifestation of the mainstreaming of the foreigner/criminal equation. Besides, the sub-title reads: 'The onslaught of the poor' (Fekete, 2009, p. 4) . The 'deviant' is depicted not only as the surplus population but as the dangerous population for the good of society as a whole. The basic thesis here is that so-called 'managed migration' is in reality a construction of an institutionalized xeno-racism, which generates the archetypal deviant (even though Fekete does not use the term herself): 'there is the resurrection of old enemies as outcast communities re-emerge as archetypal scapegoats' (Fekete, 2009, p. 13) . The Muslim communities are a key target, as an ever-deepening securitization agenda has developed via anti-Muslim racism, a process that has intensified since 11 September 2001. Moreover, the 'new McCarthyism' (Fekete, 2009) The construction of exclusionary citizenship via discourses on 'testing' whether migrants are integrated tends to 'racialize' liberal democracy across Europe. Moreover, this process reproduces an exclusionary Europeanization, as well as novel racist/populist mutations at the core of European nation-states and, increasingly, within EU institutions (for example, the European Parliament). Racial, anti-immigrant politics and ideologies and the politics of racism are not merely a question of political opportunism, or marginal phenomena connected to extreme rightwing groups. Rather, they reflect a mainstream process affecting national and European institutions (Trimikliniotis, 2007) . Anti-immigrant, xenophobic and racist ideologies of a populist kind contain specific elements of the kind of 'closure' required to marginalize, exclude and devalue the 'other': it is via the process of 'delineation of the internal boundary' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992 ) that 'the authoritarian propensity of this political logic' (Laclau, 2005, p. 197 ) is generated.
Prior to the current economic crisis, it could be argued that there had been an ideological-discursive shift away from 'welfare chauvinism' towards the notion that certain types of migrants are inherently unable to 'adapt to the western norms'. The logic of so-called migrant deviants or 'lesser breeds', thought of as unchangeable and unfixable as they can no longer 'be brought into the law' (see Gilroy, 1987; Anthias and YuvalDavis, 1992; Lahav, 2004; Trimikliniotis, 2007) , is, sadly, becoming more or less mainstream, a kind of 'common sense' in crisis-ridden Europe. It could be argued that the hatred of democracy is spreading as elitists or oligarchs refer to 'democracy' pejoratively as 'populism' simply because it threatens their order (Rancière, 2006) .
In this context the debates on integration are increasingly being caught in anti-immigration and anti-immigrant politics. We, therefore, cannot but fundamentally question how integration is constructed and instrumentalized in an ever more racialized Europe, both within the nation-states and in European institutions (see Trimikliniotis, 2012) .
Dissensus, deviance and crisis: 'combating illegal immigrants' as the flip side of integration policy
The question of migration/integration is often framed in terms of a 'crisis'. The dissensus or fundamental disagreement over migration and integration is obfuscated as a 'crisis of multiculturalism'. Rather, the debates over the 'integration of migrants', at the EU level and within each Member State, are indicative of the crisis of citizenship. We have a 'multiculturalism backlash', but this is largely driven by media and MAC/CIEM Page-77 9781137293992_05_cha04
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the political elite rather than a genuinely popular mood shift against multiculturalism: The so-called 'slow death of multiculturalism' is exaggerated (Vertovec and Wessendrof, 2010) . Nevertheless, there has been a serious change in public discourse, and the questions relating to migrants (integration, irregular migration, border control and, to some degree, racism, discrimination and xenophobia) have assumed a prominent role in European politics. The new politics of integration in Europe is a moment of re-politicization of ethnicity, race and immigration, which leads to a reframing of traditional discourses on integration-cum-national identity [ . . . ] The theme 'integration crisis' is a strategic and discursive idiom of European politics today and results in the ultra-politicization of immigration, race and ethnicity.
Research on national case studies (Silj, 2010) illustrates how the present concurrent crises in Europe are the result of serious socio-economic transformations which have produced similar shifts in policy/political terms with specific articulations racializing particular ethnic and religious groups as 'deviants'. These include shifting the emphasis to the arena of the cultural, where Islam is depicted as 'the main policy problem', with an emphasis on coercive integration solutions (for example, cultural value-based citizenship tests). Moreover, we find the expansion of 'mandatory integration regimes' across the EU, while various studies on comparative integration policies show how there is a European trend towards 'coercive integration' targeting working-class migrants and with a focus on Muslims, particularly Muslim women (see Ünsal, 2007) , primarily inspired by political demand rather than any successful impact assessment studies (Pascouau, 2012) . As the welfare state is being dismantled, the emphasis shifts from universalist goals using socioeconomic instruments to means-testing and targeting the economically deprived, excluded and marginalized. This shows a shift from economic concerns to symbolic-cultural politics. In this context a deeper political and social rift has emerged as the economic crisis is biting. the outing of Sarkozy as president, the prevailing interpretation of the anti-Roma governmental action, and the anti-immigrant politics by the French authorities in general, was that it was mere populist pandering to the 'masses' passions', masterminded by far right-wing groupings in Europe. However, as Rancière argues, we are dealing with 'a passion from above' (Rancière, 2010b) . Moreover, this matter extends well beyond the anti-Roma politics in France, as it cuts across the anti-immigrant racism across Europe and beyond. We can bring in Rancière's notion of 'cold racism' as 'an intellectual construction', which is 'primarily a creation of the state':
the very nature of the state that it is a police state, an institution that fixes and controls identities, places and displacements, an institution in permanent struggle against any surplus to the count of identities that may take place, that is to say it also struggles against that excess on the logic of identity that constitutes the action of political subjects.
We ought to extend its logic to EU-related processes. In the current world economic order, aptly characterized as 'a permanent economic state of emergency' (Žižek, 2010) , authorities are becoming 'less and less able to thwart the destructive effects of the free circulation of capital on the communities under their care' but 'are all the more unable since they are completely unwilling to'; thus, 'they then fall back on what is in their power, the circulation of people'.
Stephen Castles (2004a) also refers to the contradictions of state processes in the 'management of migration', particularly when it comes to curbing 'illegal immigration', but he offers a structural explanation: while states and supranational bodies are increasingly anxious and make more and more attempts to control migration, undocumented migration keeps on growing: 'paradoxically, the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased' (Castles, 2004b) . Also, this is not the 'plight' of so-called weak states, or small states: 'efficient states with long tradition of active migration policies' such as the UK and Germany are cited as examples of making gross policy failures; in general, we have a failure of migration policies.
Anti-immigrant racism is very much the product of the obsession with immigration control and is a key factor in generating a security-based logic, which in turn engenders new anti-immigrant fears, insecurities and moral panics. Hence, states 'take as their specific object the control of this other circulation and the national security that these immigrants threaten as their objective, that is to say more precisely the production and the management of insecurity. This work is increasingly becoming their purpose and their means of legitimation' (Rancière, 2011) . The two essential functions of the use of law, according to the French philosopher, are (a) 'an ideological function that provides a subjective figure who is a constant threat to security'; and (b) 'a practical function that continually rearranges the frontier between inside and outside, constantly creating floating identities, making those who are inside susceptible to falling outside'. Interestingly, he reads an intentionality in the legislation on immigration in constructing what he calls 'a category of sub-French people firstly intended to create a category of sub-French people, making people, who were born on French soil or to Frenchborn parents fall into the category of floating immigrants'. Moreover, he views the legislation on undocumented immigration as intending from the outset 'to make legal "immigrants" fall into the undocumented category [cela a voulu dire faire tomber dans la catégorie des clandestins des «immigrés» légaux]', which is 'the same logic that has allowed the recent use of the notion of "French of foreign origin" '. He extends the application of 'that same logic that is today aimed at the Roma, creating, against the principle of free circulation in the European space, a category of Europeans who are not truly Europeans, just as there are French who are not truly French'. For Rancière (2011) , racialization is not a contradiction or an unintended consequence of immigration regulation and a rather embarrassing problem of effective manageability of the immigration/integration question, but an intentional policy result:
In creating these suspended identities the state isn't embarrassed by the contradictions, like those we have seen in the measure concerning 'immigrants'. On the one hand, it creates discriminatory laws and forms of stigmatization founded on the idea of universal citizenship and equality before the law. This then punishes and/ or stigmatizes those whose practices run against the equality and universality of citizenship. But on the other hand, it creates within this citizenship discriminations for all, like that distinguishing the French 'of foreign origin'. So on one side all French are the same, and beware of those who are not; and on the other all are not the same.
At the core of anti-immigrant politics is the discourse and political praxis of combating 'illegal immigration', a subject intimately connected to social phenomena, such as racist populism in democratic process and debates regarding social citizenship. the examination of the construction processes of exclusionary citizenship, at both European and national level, via the discourses on undocumented migrant labour is a process that tends to racialize liberal democracy across Europe. Moreover, this process reproduces an exclusionary Europeanization, as well as novel forms of racist populist mutations present at the core of European nation-states and at an EU level. Racial, anti-immigrant politics and ideologies and politics of racism are not merely a question of political opportunism; nor is it a marginal phenomenon connected to extreme right-wing groups. Rather, it is a mainstream process, at the heart of which lies a racist ideological core in European institutions (Malik, 1996 (Malik, , 2008 Trimikliniotis, 2007) . Anti-immigrant and racist ideologies of a populist type contain specific elements of the kind of 'closure' required to marginalize, exclude and devalue the 'other': the process of 'delineation of the internal boundary' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992) generates what is called 'the authoritarian propensity of this political logic' (Laclau, 2005, p. 197) . The 'discursive construction of the community' takes a definite form with the processes of criminalization and illegalization of migrants as the central element of a 'novel' racist populism and populist racism.
Conclusion
As suggested, the various instruments of EU integration policy (formal, informal and substantial) have already been critiqued by examining their contradictions at conceptual and implementation levels. The very notion of 'integration' needs to be critically reviewed in practice, both at the level of 'high policy-making' in Brussels and as the way it is being understood and implemented in Member States. Integration must be interpreted as an evolving, highly fluid and contested concept, which reflects the balance of forces between different forces, both EU and Member State. Also, it needs to be contextualized across the variable geometry and uneven integration of Member States. This paper has placed integration debates in the context of the debates around anti-immigrant and anti-immigration politics. As such, the integration question needs to be radically reconceptualized. It seems that even critically minded scholars, who are, at least theoretically, not bound to the policy and political constraints of EU and/or national policy, are somehow 'trapped' in or 'stuck' to a concept which is highly problematic. In fact, 'integration' seems so corrupted by use and abuse that it would make sense to ditch it altogether, MAC/CIEM Page-81 9781137293992_05_cha04
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Nicos Trimikliniotis 81 had we been able to start afresh to achieve what we aim at: 'access, participation, parity and belonging' (Anthias, 2002; Anthias et al., 2012, p. 9) . However, even if it were possible to discredit and reject the concept altogether and introduce a new one at discursive or rhetorical level (for example, in policy documents), this would mean very little in practice, unless the underlying reasons for producing this policy result were to radically shift. This means addressing the underlying social, political, economic and ideological and cultural factors which define the policy question to be addressed, which in turn defines the parameters for the direction of policy for 'resolution', management or alleviation of the 'social problem'. If we were to radically transform policy, this would have to come at multiple levels. Critiques, limitations and alternatives to the dominant versions of integration need to be brought to centre stage in the various debates at EU, nation-state and local levels, with communities of migrants and social activists' voices being heard. Discursively, the critiques of immigrant migration policies are being aired at different levels, including high-level EU expert conferences; however, they have little effect in actually shifting policy. It seems that institutionally, at the EU and the nation-state level, the 'condensation of social forces', in Poulantzian terms, is such that the critiques leave little imprint on policies so far. Nonetheless, if 'the King is naked', this has to be said. Perhaps the answer to this puzzle can only be resolved in the praxis of politics, in the daily struggles that can tilt the balance of forces, rather than at a conceptual level. Resistance and alternatives to the dominant logics often need radical rejection; it may be wise, then, to sardonically concur that the only thing we like integrated, in these conditions, is, indeed, our coffee. 
Notes
